Wednesday, August 30, 2006

Prisoner Exchange

Rabbi Alfred Cohen in “Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society”(Fall 2003) has an article which discusses the issue of “Ransom or Exchange of Prisoners” , but does not come to a definite conclusion. It appears that there are no contemporary teshuvos discussing the issue.

Briefly, his reasoning and mekoros(most of which I have not myself seen) are:

1) The Mishna(Gittin 45A) states that hostages are not ransomed for more than their worth, in order not to encourage additional kidnapping(YD 252). Yet R. Yeshosua b. Chananya stated that he would have redeemed a child(R. Yishmael b. Elisha) for whatever sum demanded(Gittin 58A), and subsequently, he indeed paid a very large sum. According to one opinion in Tosaphos(ibid), the difference is that an excessive ransom may be paid if the captive’s life is at stake.

2) In the case of a prisoner exchange, the issue is: does the terrorist being considered for exchange, who may possibly murder additional people(c’vs), represent more of a “present danger” to life than the life of the captive currently at risk (“choleh l’fanecha” : Noda Biyehuda YD 200 and Chazon Ish Aveilus 208:7 re: autopsy).

3) Rabbi Cohen posits that the Halacha would differentiate between an individual and a community situation, as well as between wartime and peacetime, based on sources which do not directly discuss the issue of prisoner exchange(e.g., Tzitz Eliezer 13:100 and 12:57 re: an army risking additional soldiers’ life to rescue a captured soldier).

4) He concludes that one needs to weigh the benefit of redeeming, which raises morale in other soldiers, versus the negative consequenses of freeing terrorists, namely, the disastrous psychological, political, and physical consequences on the population of releasing violent terrorists.

5) One interesting source for # 3, is R. Yaakov Kamintesky’s dissenting opinion, disagreeing with the suggestion raised by students to ransom R’ Hutner Zt’l from the 1970 Black September hijacking for an exorbitant sum,the latter idea based on the halacha that a Talmid Chacham is ransomed even at a sum exceeding his worth. The suggestion was apparently accepted by many Rabbonim at the time as a valid option.

As related by R. Herschel Schacter, R. Yaakov felt that paying an excessive price did not apply during hostilities, when the delivery of ransom money to the enemy would strengthen their position. (“Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society”(Fall 1988).

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Tuesday, August 29, 2006

Reflections on Blogging

Is there any introspection that Bloggers and Commentators could benefit from during the current Season? Generally, life was complicated enough before the internet, but those who use this medium of communication may have particular reason for, or a particular area in where to engage in contemplation.

People have different "comfort zone's" as far as what they like to post on. Generally, I feel comfortable addressing ideas as opposed to people. I also feel that blogging is a semi-public forum, and that there is always the possibility that non-Orthodox and non-Jewish readers(media and otherwise) monitor these forums. I try to keep this in mind as I write.

There is a discussion in progress about the raison d'etre of Cross-Currents(Cross-Currents, is of course a moderated blog) . I added my thoughts to the discussion there.

Generally, I believe in the honest and open discussion of issues in some type of an appropriate forum, and not hiding one's head in the sand and ignoring a problem or issue. Every society has their problems, and the fact that the Jewish community or charedim have theirs, is not inherently a reason to view them more negatively than any other group. On the other hand, those with antipathy--Jewish or non-Jewish-- will grab on to any available ammunition which we gift to them on a silver platter.

However, the point of any discussion of a communal issue, to the extent and form it takes place, should be positive: to bring change, or at least to view the issue in an as most positive perspective as possible. The Jewish People are positive even when reflecting on intractable problems: note that we end Eicha on a positive note.

(Also, I think that generally, the more public the forum is, the more careful and sensitive one should be in expressing criticism --even constructive--of the community. Anyhow, that is the way I think that I would like to see discussion in the event that I would decide to blog on subjects that possibly would be best left for internal communal discussion; in general, each "Bal H'ablog", of course, has (or should have)their own individual policy for what they blog on and how their particular topics are discussed).

Let us hope that blogging in all forms--moderated, unmoderated, and non-online discussion groups-- will serve as a positive force in the Jewish community. If you have any suggestions for this blog or for the Blogosphere at large, feel free to add them here!

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Tuesday, August 22, 2006

Animal Personhood

This post contrasts the Torah view towards animal experimentation with that of radical animal rights activists, as well as with the philosophy of secular society in general. On a lighter note, I hope that you enjoy the four links at the end of the next section, and that you will find some of the other twenty- odd links edifying :)

Plaintiff in Animal Lawsuits: Owners or Animals ?

Are there any lawyers reading this blog? I am familiar with the tort named "intentional inflection of emotional distress". Some courts have recognized the emotional distress of an owner whose pet was maliciously killed, and authorized the recovery of damages when appropriate.

For example, in 1985, an Alaskan court ruled:

We recognize that the loss of a beloved pet can be especially distressing in egregious situations. Therefore, we are willing to recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for the intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an appropriate case…

However, the court noted that the animal had the status of personal property:

…since dogs have legal status as items of personal property, courts generally limit the damage award in cases in which a dog has been wrongfully killed to the animal's market value at the time of death.

In contradistinction to the above, what about an animal bringing a lawsuit when he or she(or itself) is the claimant?

One Animal Rights lawyer has proposed a new tort to be used by the animals(plaintiffs) against the humans(defendants). An article in The Physiologist, cited below, describes this tort succinctly as the "intentional interference with the primary interests of a chimpanzee ". Obviously, any such suits will originate by parties other than the directly aggrieved. This is based on a form of "personhood" attributed to animals, which I will elaborate on below.

On a personal note, I suppose that I have never quite grown out of my fascination with animals as a child. Although I have never wrestled with an alligator, I suppose that I share this fascination with a contemporary Jewish author, who turned his childhood interest into a career. In any event, the conflict between medical research groups and animal rights activists, as well as the discussion of "Animal Personhood" has piqued my interest.

An Animal Amongst Others ?


What was the philosophy of secular law toward animal research until the advent of the Animal Rights movement?


According to the Ethics committee of the British House of Lords:


More commonly, there are those who hold that the whole institution of morality, society and law is founded on the belief that human beings are unique amongst animals. Humans are therefore morally entitled to use animals, whether in the laboratory, the farmyard or the house, for their own purposes….. The unanimous view of the Select Committee is that it is morally acceptable for human beings to use other animals, but that it is morally wrong to cause them unnecessary or avoidable suffering…(emphasis mine -BH)


The Ethics Committee does not elaborate upon why humans are unique. Secular humanism, by definition, does not recognize the soul. Man, according to evolutionary theory, merely lies along a continuum with animals.


Assuming that the philosophical underpinning for animal law in Western civilization is not from an external source such as God(as in "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" from the Declaration of Independence), then humaneness must be utilitarian and consists of balancing of human needs and animal needs. Nature, "the law of the jungle", or "survival of the fittest", does not assign a value to actions.


However, utilitarians do indeed recognize animal rights. The "greatest possible amount of happiness among the greatest number" would include animals as well. Jeremy Bentham(Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century) was well-known for advocating both utilitarianism and animal rights.


How would a humanist talk of compassion, if in his own terms, it merely served an adaptative purpose? The need to be humane and compassionate in humanistic terms would ultimately be one of an expanded sense of of self-fulfillment. Although it is obviously better than pure hedonism, it has no intrinsic purpose beyond "self-fulfillment".

As Dr. Melaine Joy, writes:

As we widen our psycho-conscious lens to include the nonhuman
world, we may ultimately expand our sense of self, no longer limiting
our so-called individual identity to only our own body or species
but encompassing other beings as well. Developing an expanded
self may, in turn, expand our capacity for empathy, as we grow, psychically,
beyond our selves.
("Humanistic Psychology and Animal
Rights: Reconsidering the Boundaries of the Humanistic Ethic", Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 45 No. 1, Winter 2005 , pg. 123).

Beyond that, there can be no meaning to compassion and humaneness. The question of humaneness in a secular society in legal terms, was further discussed at the Harvard symposium by Allan Dershowitz.

In contrast, the Jewish value system, is defined in terms of spirituality, neshama and mitzvos. The person, containing a soul, relates with compassion to fellow humans containing a neshama, and ultimately to Hashem, the All-Merciful or the ultimate rachaman.

Furthermore, the Jewish people, tasked with the mission of l'saken olam b'malchus shakai, should be concerned with changing the atheistic view of portions of Western society, even if such change is best made by concentrating on within, and by ripple-effect.


In any event, apparently based on a view similar to that above, of the House of Lords, some groups like the ASPCA, merely seek to minimize cruelty in animals, and do not call for outlawing experimentation. This is called animal "welfarisim", as opposed to animal "rights"(Joy, ibid).


Two Views of Personhood


Steve Michael in "Animal Personhood: A Threat to Reserach?" (The Physiologist, December, 2004) writes from the perspective of the medical research community, and points out the potential threats to research from animal rights activists. As pointed out in the article, there are two types of personhood. One is merely a legal concept which applies to other inanimate objects as well-- corporations, partnerships, and other entities. "Personhood", under this category would be a legal fiction allowing animals(or their representatives) to sue or be sued. However, such personhood would not create new, or additional rights.


Switzerland, is quoted in the linked article as recognizing animals as "beings and not things" in a 1992 amendment. This would seem to be a form of the above type of personhood.


A second, more radical view of "personhood" nearly equates animals with people. This view, as summarized by Michael in the above-referenced article holds that :


certain animals are so much like humans, based upon their mental abilities, they should enjoy at a minimum, the basic legal rights afforded to the least capable humans.


Richard Wrangham, professor of anthropology at Harvard University, explained at a Harvard Law School symposium the idea of nearly equating man and beast using the following thought exercise(based on Oxford University evolutionary theorist Richard Dwarkins) :

Imagine taking your grandmother to the University of Michigan football stadium. I taught at the University of Michigan for a few years so, on a Saturday afternoon, I know that you have an empty stadium that fills up in a couple of hours. You go there with your grandmother and you are the first two people to sit down, and then the thought game is, she has her grandmother sit next to her, and then she has her grandmother sit next to her. You are sitting, chatting passionately to your grandmother, because you really care about sports, and two hours later you feel a nudge in your back, and who is it? There is the person. It is someone very much in the gorilla, chimpanzee, bonobo mold, another big, black, hairy thing that walks on its knuckles and has got a protruding mouth, probably very much like a chimpanzee. We are a great ape.

Two famous stories come to mind:

(1) Rabbi Yaakov Kamintesky explained to Yerucham Meschel, head of Histadrut, the difference between R' Yaakov's grandchildren, who doted on him, as compared to Meschel's, who didn't respect him. The latter's philosophy of Darwinism led to his children and grandchildren progressively devaluing him.

(2) Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv of Kelm stated that Darwin could not have said his theory had he met Rav Yisrael Salanter. It would be obvious to everyone that such a transcendent human being, an adam hashaleim, could only be the handiwork of God.

(If you believe that guided evolution--not the subject of this post-- is compatible with the pesukim of Maseh Berieshis, adapt the stories accordingly) .



Animal Experimentation


Also at this Harvard symposium, Steve Wise, an animal rights lawyer and lecturer at Harvard Law School, and author of Rattling the Cage, was asked by Michael :


Under what circumstances would it be permissible to use chimpanzees in medical research? Is it always wrong? Morally wrong? If there were significant and clear benefits for finding cures to serious illnesses, would it then be permissible to use chimpanzees in research?


Wise answered:


Well, at least legally, and probably morally, the only time I believe one should be able to use a chimpanzee in research is a situation where one would also use a four-year-old human child. Not many.

Michaels also quotes Roger Fouts, Professor of Psychology and Co-Director of the Chimpanzee-Human Communication Institute, who responded to the above question:

Why are we afraid of death, when it is such a natural thing? Why do we have to take an endangered species [chimpanzees] to help an overpopulated species [humans] to become more overpopulated?


I told this response to a relative who is quick on the uptake. She wryly suggested that perhaps some of the chimpanzees activists might care to volunteer their own lives to help keep in check the overpopulated species of humans.


A Community of Equals


The Great Ape Project is collecting petitions to extend a "community of equals" to all members of the community. Such a community consists of


Equals to include all great apes: human beings, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orangutans. (emphasis mine- BH)


Rights would include:

  • right to live
  • protection of individual liberty and
  • prohibitions against torture to apes.

As part of "protection of individual liberty" the aggrieved parties who have been detained against their will:


must have the right to appeal, either directly or, if they lack the relevant capacity, through an advocate, to a judicial tribunal.


In Chapter 1 of Rattling the Cage, Wise calls killing chimpanzees murder and genocide:


I hope you will conclude, as I do in Chapter 11, that justice entitles chimpanzees and bonobos to legal personhood and to the fundamental legal rights of bodily integrity and bodily liberty—now. Kidnapping them, selling them, imprisoning them, and vivisecting them must stop—now. Their abuse and their murder must be forbidden for what they are: genocide.(emphasis mine-BH)

One of the goals of the Chimpanzee and Human Communication Institute (CHCI) at Central Washington University(linked above) is to:

encourage in other humans respect, responsibility, and compassion for all of our fellow apes by offering unique, engaging educational programs and resources to elementary, secondary, and post-secondary students and the public at large(emphasis mine-BH).


Protecting Animals from Other Animals ?


According to Cass Sunstei, University of Chicago Law School Professor of Jurisprudence, at the above Harvard Law symposium , people might have an obligation to protect animals against their predators:

… animals' freedom of choice might indeed impose on human beings an obligation of protection, to the extent that it is costless, against predations of other animals. If a domesticated animal or wild animal is about to be killed by a predator, and we can prevent the murder (emphasis mine-BH) without cost, why not? Why ought we not say that the rights run against third parties that are animals, as well as third parties who are human? I have a fear that in some pockets of the animal rights movement there is a romanticization of natural processes, which often are in animals interests compared with human processes but not always. Nature itself is often cruel, and if we can reduce the cruelty, by all means we should.



Not Homo Sapiens


The Torah permits us to use make use of animals for human benefit while enjoining us against Tzar Balei Chaim(see here, halacha # 13). I have seen a reference to an article on animal experimentation in Tradition by Rabbi J. David Bleich(1986 Spring;22(1):1-36), and the topic is covered more recently, I believe, in Rabbi Natan Slifkin's "Man and Beast".


Rabbi Berel Wein(Living Jewish, pp. 278-280) has noted that polio research would not be possible without the rhesus monkey. Parenthetically, it is also interesting that according to this 1956 article, at a certain point, India was considering regulating export of monkeys due to the sacredness of monkeys to Hindu's. However, India was the first chosen by President Eisenhower to receive the formula of the Salk vaccine, because of the role Indian rhesus monkeys imported into America played in the development of the vaccine.


Rabbi Wein, in the above article, writes that the Torah demands balance and perspective in general, and that this applies specifically regarding man's relationship with the animal world. He notes that animal researchers may be cruel to people as in the Passuk : "Those who kiss the calves are those who slaughter humans"(Hosea 13:2). Obviously a balance is needed.


Similarly, the following is told about Rav Yeruchum Levovitz in this linked article :

On a visit to inter-war Berlin, Rabbi Yerucham Levovitz of Mirrer witnessed household pets dressed in pants and sweaters. He commented: "Where they treat animals as humans, in that place they will slaughter humans as animals," and he quoted the verse "Those who slaughter men will kiss their calves" (Hosea 13:2).


Sometimes, one sees dogs being walked that have protective clothing on their bodies in the winter, to keep them warm in the bitter cold. I imagine that Rav Yerucham was not referring to such type of clothing.


What distinguishes the Torah attitude from even the moderate secular attitude is that a man has a Divine Spark, Tzelem Elokim, and is able to choose between good and bad: vayipach b'apev nishmas chayim, God breathed into man a part of Himself, as it were. Thus we reject merely being "unique among animals", as described above by the British House of Lords.


Nevertheless, the Torah instructs us about Tzar Balei Chaim. Animals may not have "personhood" in the sense of animal rights activists, but we are instructed to be careful, in the stewardship granted to us over the earths resources, and not to cause unnecessary pain to any creature.


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Monday, August 21, 2006

The Death and Rebirth of Humane Learning

by Jak Black and Bari

I. The Death of Mada

Recently, Harry posted a link to a summation of the thought of Rav Aaron Lichtenstein (henceforth RAL) a proponent of Torah U'Mada and Centrist Orthodoxy. Although my personal experience and understanding of the hashkafa were enough for me to reject it as a lifestyle, I decided that I would take a close look at the article and revisit the ideas. The article can be found here. In the comments section to Harry's blog, a fellow named Mark linked to a relatively recent article in Jewish Action which contained a critical analysis by Dr. William Kohlbrener of RAL's views, as well as a response to the raised issues by RAL himself.

I'll be frank. After reading the original article, plus the newer material in Jewish action, it is clear that RAL's views on mada have been refuted as a practical worldview, at least in its present academia-centric form. I choose my words carefully here, because although his vision of secular education has merit on a theoretical plane, in practice its value is dubious at best, and probably harmful to the average student.

I will present a summary of the arguments of Dr. Kohlbrener that I found particular compelling, though I advise anyone interested in the subject take a look at the articles himself. Following Kohlbrener's criticisms, I will add a couple of my own, followed by an analysis of RAL's rebuttal.

Dr. Kohlbrener begins by explaining he agrees with the theoretical assumption of RAL’s hashkafa of mada. Meaning, in its purest form, humane learning does have the potential to enhance general and Torah understanding; secular learning does have intrinsic worth. However, he finds serious problems with the implementation of the hashkafa. Kohlbrener divides his criticisms into two halves: problems inherent in the nature of the students (and the society in which they find themselves), and, "more fundamentally," problems concerning the nature of the modern university.

The first criticism is aimed at the nature of the students. Modern youth completely immersed in the secular culture really have no desire for the acquisition of humane learning. He writes,


When addressing a group of students from a Modern Orthodox yeshiva in Jerusalem, I was surprised at the resistance that I had elicited through my comments about Torah Umadda (which reflected some of my reservations that I am mentioning here.)...Though most of them did, in fact, stand up for the concept, they failed to give the impression that it was anything more than a rallying cry that they had inherited from their teachers.


What explained their intense loyalty to the theoretical idea of mada, but their intense disinterest in actually acquiring it?


I remained confused...until one of the young men confided: "It's not so much that we're interested in Torah Umadda, what we are really interested in is Torah and entertainment"...He revealed that the primary concern of many yeshivah boys...is not incorporating the classics into the life of the ben Torah, but rather accommodating Torah into a contemporary lifestyle - of popular culture, of movies and of MTV.


Kohlbrener's second criticism directed toward the students (and in this case, the layperson too) deals with RAL's position that mada is mandated by the necessity of "understanding the secular mind" within the parameters of kiruv. Kohlbrener asks,


If knowing the zeitgeist means knowing Schwarzenegger, does it mean that we and our talmidim, the leaders of the next generation, should be on line to buy tickets to the next sequel to Terminator? For Rambam, knowing madda meant having access to the classical texts of Athenian culture. For the current generation, madda…includes Yahoo!, The Matrix and MTV.


Kohlbrener's next set of criticisms is aimed at academia itself. Simply put, there is very little humane learning left in the universities, and the average student is unlikely to be exposed to this remnant. It is my personal feeling that Kohlbrener's characterization of academia, excoriating though it is, is actually rather kind. Certainly, the constraints of an article in JA limit a full exposition of the subject, which has been analyzed in countless volumes. As I’ve recommended previously, I suggest the works of Bloom, D'Souza and Kirk as a starting place for a fuller understanding of the changes that have swept the halls of academia.

At any rate, in Kohlbrener's words, the problem with the modern university is that the attitude of engagement with the classic works "has been replaced by a hermeneutics of suspicion - an interpretative attitude in which the interpreter finds himself not subservient, but rather superior to the texts he encounters." Because the student no longer engages with the text, but rather seeks to impose on it his own ideas, it is unlikely that he will unearth the wisdom that lies within. One manifestation of this trend is the movement known as multiculturalism, which seeks, in broad terms, to impose our ideas of gender, race and class on the unwitting classics.

To these criticisms, I add the following two points: First, RAL admits that a student engaged in secular learning must constantly be on the lookout for pernicious influences. But unfortunately, RAL is short on the details of this scheme. If, for example, we sent an aged scholar wise in the ways of the Torah to a university, he would probably be able to detect the points which are out of synch with Torah hashkafa. But how is a simple student to do so? Worse, we’re discussing a student who has not even formed a coherent set of Torah hashkafos. How can he possibly avoid being perverted in manners both evident and obscure?

Second, it is clear that although there are humane insights to be gained from the classics, there is no question that incisive individuals will find those insights in the Torah itself. This is true whether we are talking about psychological insights, interpersonal sensitivity, historical awareness, or any other area of human understanding. Chazal themselves expressed this idea in the mishna, "Ben Bag Bag says: Investigate it and investigate it, because it contains everything" (Avos 5:22). It is true, of course, that the majority of people cannot uncover these insights themselves. Yet the same is clearly true of humane learning. And just as unique voices in the secular world transmit their understanding and insights into the classics to the general populace, so too gedolim such as the Alter from Slabodka and Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky transmit their insight into the Torah to generations of talmidim who in turn become the next teachers of the Jewish people. When balanced against the risk the average reader takes when delving into disciplines that are as full of secular values and even heresy as they are of humane insight, there’s really no question about the advisability of such an endeavor.

In his rebuttal to Dr. Kohlbrener, RAL focuses on the distinction between ideology and practice, sticking to his conviction that while in practice it may be difficult, or even dangerous, to follow this hashkafa, the theory is still correct. Unfortunately, with all due respect, RAL seems to have disregarded Burke's injunction: "Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect. the circumstances are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind." How true! If one chooses any value, even the most lofty of the Torah, such as love, charity and mercy, he finds that it has been qualified in one way or more likely several. Yes, we must love everyone - but not our enemies. Yes, we must be merciful - but one is merciful to the cruel will eventually be cruel to the merciful. It is quite clear that there is no such thing as an ideology distinct and distanced from its praxis. It is always the concrete circumstances which give vitality and meaning to a value. It follows that if there is no realistic and practical method for the implementation of RAL’s hashkafa, it cannot be viewed as anything but an intellectual curiosity akin to liberalism or socialism, which appear admirable on paper, but are useless in the real world of human passions.

RAL is clearly aware of the inherent weakness of this stance. He writes,


Does this concession relegate my argument to the dustbin of anachronism? I trust not...Hashkafically, it makes an enormous difference whether a prospective student shies away from classical culture out of an admiration tempered by apprehension or out of contemptuous disdain.


Well, that might be so, but it verges on the rhetorical. Disdain is the manifest destiny of reasoned apprehension, and the utilitarian and even useful social parlance of refuted ideologies. Sure, television might be great if it wasn’t so corrupt. But practically speaking, it’s contemptuous junk – nothing more.

RAL continues, "Secondly, my position remains meaningful at the practical plane as well," but then merely points to a few individuals as proof of this assertion. He claims that "Dr. Kolbrener may have tightened the noose, but he has not asphyxiated the patient." Frankly, I don’t see how this is so; the patient seems to have died decades ago. RAL continues,


Third, even advocates of Dr. Kolbrener's position can acknowledge the need to keep the home fires burning in hope for better times...Even if winter’s here, might we not, with inspired vision and informed counsel, anticipate the spring?


The metaphorical beauty aside, RAL is again short on the details of this scheme. He assumes that academia will rehabilitate itself at some point, yet I see no reason to make such an assumption; clearly, the trend is toward decadence rather than recrudescence. And who, precisely, should be the ones we send out to brave the storm? What percentage of our living, breathing children should we willingly sacrifice on the altar of mada for the pease-porridge of a distant dream? It’s certainly not going to be my children.

RAL as much as admits that his hashkafa will cause a certain amount of spiritual loss. His response?


Yet before we rush to judgment, we should bear in mind a crucial variable. In assessing benefits and risks, we routinely differentiate between focused dangers and statistical projections…It is palpably clear that many souls could be saved if kollelim were shut down en masse and their members sent out to engage in kiruv. Nevertheless, no such course is ever contemplated...Perhaps one might challenge any comparison between the danger of loss of the committed with forgoing possible gains among the currently uncommitted. Nevertheless, the example is instructive by way of illustrating a readiness to distinguish between focused threat and statistical projection.


I find these words rather shocking. RAL admits that his comparison is flawed for a number of reasons, but asks that we nevertheless utilize the kernel of the idea, that we must distinguish between focused threat and statistical projection. This is a straightforward admission that we are willing to trade a certain amount of our youth for the ideology of mada. Yet even according to RAL himself, the only purpose of the secular studies is that they might possibly lead to a greater appreciation and enlightenment of the Torah itself. Frankly, this is analogous to throwing out the baby and keeping the bathwater.

In the spirit of Barthes who pronounced the death of the author, I now pronounce the death of mada as a practical ideology.

II. The Resurrection of Humane Learning

Some, of course, will question the above in light of the realities if one of the authors of this diatribe. How can Jak Black, who insists on peppering his posts with obscure references to Edmund Burke and Russell Kirk, and obviously continues to study secular works, have the gall to proclaim the death of mada? The careful reader will have noticed the answer already. The problem with mada is not in the secular learning itself, but rather in the practical forms of academia.

Let's be clear here. In the frum world of modern America, the marriage of Centrism, Modern Orthodoxy or even Chareidism with academia is not based on a love of mada. Oh, sure, some minority might wish to attend university for a love of secular learning and a true appreciation of the way humane learning can enhance the Torah (and I place RAL among this group.) But that minority is so insignificant as to hardly merit attention. The overwhelming majority of people attend college or university strictly for utilitarian purposes – because a university degree is a prerequisite for many types of livelihood. However, in recent years, it has become clear that the social and intellectual environment of the modern university, far from being conducive to a Torah lifestyle, actually poses to it a grave threat.

Chareidim have answered this challenge in a most logical and pragmatic fashion; through yeshiva/college programs, there has been a conscious effort to limit the exposure of students to secular studies, while still retaining the ability to receive the vaunted degree. University studies – as distinct from humane learning - are no longer viewed as intrinsically worthwhile, regardless of how they were viewed in the past, and by whom, but rather as the budding of a parnassah. This pragmatic view also counters any inherent problems of bitul Torah. And what of the gradations of quality? Sure, a Harvard degree might carry more weight than one from Touro. But this, it seems, is the place where bitachon must draw the line between the reasonable histadlus of attaining a college degree and the unreasonable hishtadlus of placing oneself for four years in an anti-Torah environment for the sake of a qualitative advantage, however great it might be. So college yes, Yale no.

Many in the Centrist world, on the other hand, begin with the assumption that only a full course of university studies is acceptable, and this preferably at an ivy league institution. The ideal of Torah U'Mada is then used, ex post facto, as a rationalization for the intrinsic worth of the secular program. Centrism, in which the supposedly balanced youth can juggle all disparate ideological elements and overcome all hormonal-induced challenges if only we have fortified him with enough strength and resilience, becomes the justification for throwing our children to the lions. Reality is never allowed to intrude on this pleasant reverie.

It helps to clarify the issue when we examine the roots of the problem. As I said in my previous post on educational issues, it was once taken for granted that the university is a place of humane study. But as Albert Jay Nock describes in his Memoirs of a Superfluous Man, academia was perverted with the unholy marriage of education and training. He writes,


The theory of the revolution was based on a flagrant popular perversion of the doctrines of equality and democracy. Above all things the mass-mind is most bitterly resentful of superiority. It will not tolerate the thought of an elite; and under a political system of universal suffrage, the mass-mind is enabled to make its antipathies prevail by sheer force of numbers...In the prevalent popular view, therefore, - the view insisted upon and as far as possible enforced by the mass-men whom the mass-men whom the masses instinctively cleave to and choose as leaders, - in this view the prime postulate of equality is that in the realm of the spirit as well as of the flesh, everybody is able to enjoy anything that anybody can enjoy; and the prime postulate of democracy is that there shall be nothing for anybody to enjoy that is not open for anybody to enjoy. An equalitarian and democratic regime must by consequence assume, tacitly or avowedly, that everybody is educable...

The worst result of this was a complete effacement of the line which sets off education from training, and the line which sets off formative knowledge from instrumental knowledge. This
obliteration was done deliberately to meet the popular perversions of equality and democracy. The regime perceived that while very few can be educated, everyone who is not actually imbecile or idiotic can be trained in one way or another, as soldiers are trained in military routine, or as monkeys are trained to pick fruit. Very well then, it said in effect, let us agree to call training education, convert our schools, colleges, universities into training-schools as far as need be, but continue to call them educational institutions and to call our general system an educational system. We will insist that the discipline of instrumental studies is as formative as any other, even more so, and to quite as good purpose, in fact much better. We will get up courses in “business administration,” bricklaying, retail shoe-merchandising, and what-not, agree to call our graduates educated men, give them all the old-style academic degrees, dress them out in the old-style gowns and hoods,—and there we are, thoroughly democratic, thoroughly equalitarian, in shape to meet all popular demands.

In truth, as many agree, there is value in humane learning. My point here is that there is very little humane learning left in the universities. A frank admission of this painful fact would help clear away many of the cobwebs that obscure this issue. Yet in truth, there is no reason whatsoever that humane learning must remain inextricably linked to academia. As Rabbi Fred puts it,


To the extent that universities actually try to teach anything, which is to say to a very limited extent, they do little more than inhibit intelligent students of inquiring mind. And they are unnecessary: The professor’s role is purely disciplinary: By threats of issuing failing grades, he ensures that the student comes to class and reads certain things. But a student who has to be forced to learn should not be in school in the first place. By making a chore of what would otherwise be a pleasure, the professor instills a lifelong loathing of study.

The truth is that universities positively discourage learning. Think about it. Suppose you wanted to learn Twain. A fruitful approach might be to read Twain. The man wrote to be read, not analyzed tediously and inaccurately by begowned twits. It might help to read a life of Twain. All of this the student could do, happily, even joyously, sitting under a tree of an afternoon. This, I promise, is what Twain had in mind.


This sounds so unsophisticated as to be naïve, but his words are utterly correct. If one really wishes to acquire humane learning, all he need do is open a book and begin to study. This can be done anywhere and any time of the day, and the truly diligent can even set aside times for his study. I imagine most Roshei Yeshiva would agree that if one is willing to forgo a time-wasting university schedule in favor of extra years in the beis midrash, that one might even set aside a complete night-seder for his humane studies. If one becomes so enamored of a certain poet or author that he is literally aching to hear what the modern world has to say on the subject, there are biographies and critical studies available on virtually every subject known to man.

Certainly, one who wishes to acquire a humane education will have no problem in his search. Every book known to mankind is available either new on Amazon.com, or used on Abebooks.com. All one need do is locate a book and study. In fact, this scheme has a great advantage, as modern educational methods, typified by the university, inculcate the fallacious notion that learning is something done in school. In truth, learning is a lifelong process. One might even suggest that a person who learns to be self-sufficient in his studies and to repudiate the stifling educational paradigms of academia will find himself more prepared for a humane education than his university counterparts. I am even tempted to suggest the unthinkable heresy that one who habituates himself to this manner of study will find himself more educated than the typical college graduate.

Of course, this is not easily done in the present age. Mass educational methods have succeeded in distorting the motivation of teacher and student alike, bringing education to the nadir where a majority of people associate humane learning with the fondness of having a tooth extracted. But if so, then so be it; I’m obviously not advocating secular studies. If one wishes to remain within the dalet amos of halacha alone, I’m all for that. I’m merely saying that if one really does wish to enhance his Torah with secular learning, that he needn’t – and shouldn’t – turn to academia as a means to that end.

Nor is YU the answer to the problem. The lines that divide the serious Torah students on one half from the average college students on the other were drawn long ago. For all intents and purposes, YU is no different from any other university. A student who is interested in truly immersing himself in his Torah studies, while merely salting that understanding with a modicum of secular learning will not even be allowed to receive a semicha - unless he runs the gauntlet of a "full" secular education. For those who carry nostalgic memories in their breast, read the words of "Former YU." Among a veritable laundry-list of fundamental problems with YU he writes,


Shaalvim and KBY students don't increasingly don't go to YU because almost no one feels a sense of caring about them. I left as the assistant mashgichim were coming but still the nature of the college is that no one cares if there are mechallei shabbos (some even b'farhesya), no kippah wearing, pornography in the dorms. That is from the non-frum and doesn't touch on the girls hanging around campus that detract from learning as well as internet, TV and movies. So unless one is highly motivated and is comfortable flowing against the tide it is very difficult to maintain the same seriousness as in yeshiva in Israel...

It is time for a frank admission from Centrists that academia has become corrupted, and that there is little humane learning left in the universities. If a person truly wishes to live up to the ideal of mada, there is nothing preventing one from acquiring that wisdom beyond the setting of a university. Unfortunately, that would require a true desire for mada alone, rather than the attendant jollity that accompanies a university education. Of course, if a university degree is strictly necessary for a chosen path of livelihood - and often it isn't - then ways must be found to mitigate the impact of academia, beginning with a dual yeshiva/university program that greatly minimizes the number of non-utilitarian secular studies. If not, the situation will only worsen over time, as academia continues its downward spiral into irrelevance. A more serious attempt to focus on, and apply, the ideals of bitachon in the realm of parnassah would be another excellent path of investigation (one can begin with: Igros Moshe, yoreh dei’ah IV 36:1. See also ibid. 12, 16.)

Mada is dead. Long live mada!

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Thursday, August 17, 2006

da'as Torah and false dichotomies

My co-blogger Bari sets up the following hypothetical in the comment field of a previous post:
"But, if the average MO person, or any frum person, were told by a doctor not to go through a certain medical procedure, and, say, the Chazon Ish caught wind of that and called him on your cell and told him not to heed the doctor and go ahead with the procedure - would he: a) Unhesitatingly follow the doctor b) Grapple with it c) Unhesitatingly follow the CI?"
Other commentators have stolen some of my thunder - apologies for any repetition. To my mind this hypothetical is unreasonable because it sets up a false dichotomy. Despite my respect for the Chazon Ish, I would unhesitatingly hang up the phone because that is what the halacha itself demands that I do! To wit, in hilchos Yom Kippur matters of issur v’heter like eating on Yom Kippur are decided based on the expertise of the medical doctor consulted, even (according to some poskim) if that doctor is not even Jewish. If a doctor tells me to eat on Yom Kippur otherwise my life would be endangered, any advice of a posek to the contrary based on their intuition carries no halachic weight. The function of halacha is to apply G-d’s law to the facts at hand, but the determination of the facts at hand is the province of experts in individual fields. Anyone who has opened a gemara is familiar with its format of case law: given case X, the halacha is Y. In this equation, the medical expert or other technical expert's role is clarifying X; the posek's role given X is clarifying Y. If I present a piece of neveilah to the Chazon Ish and he mistakingly paskens the meat is kosher, does that make it so? Do I say "tzadik gozeir v'Hashem mekayeim" and assume the property of the meat magically changes? Absolutely not! The metziyus dictates the halacha, and if a mistake is made in determining the former, the latter will unquestionably be wrong.
It seems to me that a fundemental error is made in extending the principle of da'as Torah (and I hate that term) and assigning expertise to poskim in areas outside halacha and hashkafa. The The gemara in Shabbos (85a) asks: how did the Chachamim know the shiur yenika of plants? Answers the gemara: they consulted the experts, the Chivim and Emorim, who knew farming. The Rambam bases Kiddush haChodesh on astronomy learned from the non-jewish world (Kiddush haChodesh 17:24). The gemara (Pesachim 94b) even writes that the non-Jewish experts opinion proven more correct than that of the Chachamim in a matter of astronomy (and R’ Akiva Eiger’s comment there is irrelevant, v’ain kan mekomo). These are but a few examples. You should no more ask a posek for medical advise than you should ask your doctor to help resolve an issue of ethics. And a posek who would attempt to rule on a question that demands medical or technical knowledge without consultation with the experts in the field will inevitably err. I simply do not understand how one can ask a posek to rule on a metziyus.
This misapplication of the concept of da’as Torah leads to a phenomenon that struck me when I recently saw a book of questions asked to an adam gadol. Does a gadol really need to be asked whether one must help one’s wife to take out the garbage? Or whether a child should be allowed play time after school? What are the halachic issues of consequence here? This is not “da’as Torah”, but simply an excuse to avoid thinking, what Rav Kook calls the substitution of “yiras hamachshava” for “yiras Shamayim”. It seems that the concept of “da’as Torah” has become a catch all, whereby gedolim are assigned the role of guru to deal with all of life’s problems, from the most complex to the most mundane – they are experts on everything and must be consulted on everything. A local Rav told me he was called by newlyweds for advise on how their new can opener works. This is nothing less than a trivialization of the halachic system, a waste of time for all involved.
The role of da'as Torah should be limited to (a) expert determination and clarification of the technicalities of halacha, and (b) expert clarification of the spirit of the law, which halacha itself mandates considering (see Ramban on v'asita hayashar v'hatov). Technical advice, professional advice, practical questions, and issues that your mother and a little common sense should enable you to solve should not be laid at the feet of the giants of Torah.

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Wednesday, August 16, 2006

It's Judaism, But Not As We Know It. Or is it?

I just returned from a very pleasant three day vacation with my wife to Niagara Falls – the children stayed home with their grandparents. Suffice it to say that a short term, adult-only vacation is a great stress buster; I highly recommend it. That is not what I am posting about, however.

Our hotel, like many hotels, passes out free newspapers at your door every morning, in this case a popular newspaper called USA TODAY. I’ve seen that paper in prior business travels, and it seems to be popular because it gives you a quick overview of national issues, business, weather etc.

As I was perusing our free paper over breakfast, I could not help but be drawn to an op-ed about abortion. Here is the link: http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060814/opcomreligion37.art.htm

This was an unusual op-ed because it was written by a professor of “moral theology” at a rather obscure university, whom the footnote indicated had authored a book with the tendentious title “The Right to Contraception and Abortion in Ten World Religions.” I immediately skipped down to the section on Judaism, and sure enough, was treated to this blurb:


Judaism:

Because of the survival challenges Jews have faced historically,
Judaism places great stress on children as a blessing. Nonetheless, as Orthodox
theologian Laurie Zoloth says, “Abortion appears as an option for Jewish women
from the earliest sources of the Bible and Mishnaic commentary.” According to
most Jewish authorities, the fetus does not have the status of a nefesh, a
person, until the head emerges in the birthing process. This does not mean,
however, that late-term abortions would be deemed acceptable in all
circumstances. In some cases, performing an abortion is even considered a
mitzvah, a sacred duty, not a “lesser evil.”

My first reaction was: Aaaargh!!!!! My second was: Who are they kidding?

Now I am well aware that there is a dispute in the sources, of the Mishna in Ohalos, the Gemaras in Sanhedrin, the views of Rashi and the Rambam. Still, I think that among modern day poskim – say in the last 200 years – there is a consensus, more or less, that abortion is (1) generally forbidden; (2) mandated for pikuach nefesh (to save the life of the mother) and (3) may be permitted in other, narrow circumstances not quite pikuach nefesh but still rather severe. I think it would be fair to say that one would be hard pressed to find respected, mainstream Orthodox poskim who would permit an abortion in all but the narrowest non-pikuach nefesh circumstance and even harder pressed to find any Orthodox authority who would advocate abortion as an “option” for Jewish women. (Indeed, if anything the two most prominent Orthodox “theologians” of recent times – Rav Soloveichik and Rav Moshe Feinstein – were, to my knowledge, rather strict on the issue.)

Apart from the substantive deficiency, my next issue is the only authority cited is “Orthodox theologian Laurie Zoloth.” Who? I have never heard the name even in the negative sense (e.g. bloggers ranting about the near kefirah that goes on in some left-wing Orthodox circles) and certainly never quoted as an authority. A quick Google search indicates that Ms. Zoloth is a Professor of Ethics who considers herself Orthodox and writes and lectures about ethical issues, primarily medical ethics.

Then there are the downright misleading portions:

Because of the survival challenges Jews have faced historically, Judaism places great stress on children as a blessing. This is academic Judaism at its worst, IMO. Children have been considered a blessing ever since HKBH blessed Adam and Eve and commanded them to be fruitful and multiply. The Torah tells us that Hashem picked Avraham Avinu as the father of the Jewish people precisely because he would perpetuate the tradition of the way of Hashem to his offspring. Hence Avraham prayed mightily for children to continue his mission.

Abortion appears as an option for Jewish women from the earliest sources of the Bible and Mishnaic commentary. – Really? Where? The sources I know about are the pesukim in Mishpatim (Shemos 21:22) which talks about an unintentional abortion and the Mishna Ohalos 7:6, which talks about a women having labor problems. Option? Where?

In some cases, performing an abortion is even considered a mitzvah, a sacred duty, not a "lesser evil.” And what circumstances might those be, hmmm? Why pikuach nefesh, that’s when. Kind of let’s the air out of the rhetorical tire, no?

So, to put it mildly, the blurb is highly misleading. Yes, I know I could write in to the editor, but frankly I doubt it do much good in this case. Still, I think we can derive several lessons from this little event:
  • Don’t believe everything you read, especially about religion. The same article talks about religious views of abortion in such varied religions as Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism and Taoism. I haven’t a clue as to whether they are accurate or not. But having seen how the “Jewish” view was completely butchered, I would read the rest with several pounds of salt.

  • People who know better will slant things to fit their agenda. I find it hard to believe that the author of the article, if he was really interested in finding out the Orthodox Jewish position on abortion, could not come a lot closer than what he did. Rabbi J.D. Bleich, for one, has easily accessible, English reviews of such “contemporary” halakhic issues. Even your average LOR would realize that the above blurb, whatever it is, is not Judaism as we know it, and could point the good Professor to the pertinent sources. So where there is an axe to grind, there will be a grinding stone to grind it.

  • Academic theology commands more respect in the non-Orthodox and non-Jewish world than we are used to. In the world of Orthodoxy, the position of the Jewish academic – by wish I mean those engaged in study of some aspect of Judaism, such as history, theology, religion, etc. in the context of secular academia – is marginal at best. In the Orthodox world, the religious leaders are poskim, Roshei Yeshiva, and prominent rabbonim. A “Professor of Jewish Theology” is viewed as, at best, a curiosity and at worst a suspect heretic. An authority on the position of “Judaism” on controversial issues like abortion, certainly not.
    My impression is that this is emphatically not the case in Reform and Conservative circles, not to mention in non-Jewish circles.
    This has to be kept in mind when discussing Jewish issues with those outside the Orthodox fold. The fact that “Professor X at Bar Ilan” thinks that there is no reason for us to observe Tisha Be Av is interesting, but frankly has no impact whatsoever on the practice of Orthodox Judaism in just about any circle I know of, be it, MO, RZ or Charedi. But those outside the Orthodox world may not be aware of that reality.





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Sunday, August 13, 2006

Samuel Francis and The Enigma of Modern Liberalism

I saw something interesting the other day. For the longest time, I haven't been able to understand the ideology of modern liberalism. Oh sure, I understand its fundamental tenets. But the canon of thought that defines liberalism seems, for lack of a better word, mistaken. Its conception of man, its view of the world and the goals of society, its understanding of the transcendent - they are all flawed and demonstrably incorrect. Since the early 60’s, with the publication of Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, liberal policies have been systematically exposed as utter failures. In fact, it is well known that the neoconservative idea arose primarily as a reaction to the failure of liberalism. As Irving Kristol put it, neoconservatives are simply "liberals who have been mugged by reality." And Norman Podhoretz suggested that neoconservatives should more properly be called neo-liberals.

Of course, the idea that one's intellectual rivals are patently mistaken might cheer some partisans, and to a certain degree, I too partake of this cup. But frankly, it flummoxes me more than it delights. How can it be that so many people subscribe to ideas that are so clearly mistaken? How, just to name one example, can anyone in their right mind support affirmative action, when its policies have proven to exacerbate rather than assuage racial divisiveness?

Obviously, I know the conservative view of modern liberalism - it is nothing more than the manifest destiny of individualism and egalitarianism lacking the normative checks of the past; in Bork’s terminology, radical individualism and radical egalitarianism. I mean by this that according to conservative intellectuals, there does not exist a defense per se of modern liberalism. It is not an ideology that one might subscribe to, but rather an insidious perversion of the formerly noble goals of true (albeit flawed) thinkers such as Locke, John Stuart Mill and Emerson.

And yet, I assume, surely this is not the way modern liberals view themselves. Surely there are liberals out there that have produced a coherent exposition and defense of the modern liberal idea. So I began to read what they had to offer, from the punditry of Alan Colmes and Al Franken, to more serious works by Robert Reich, John Rawls and others. I spoke to my liberal friends. I trolled political discussion boards.

But nothing helped. The ideas of modern liberalism are, quite simply, so much bunkum. In all my life, I’ve never seen so many arguments based on sentimentality, disingenuousness, appeals to amorphous and fluid concepts, and just plain stupidity.

This is to say nothing of what passes for partisan political discourse on the J-Bloggosphere. I'm practically embarrassed to recount some of the liberal positions I've seen espoused by supposedly rational commentators. The most recent I recall was a group of liberal commentators who took the jaw-dropping position that a druggist who refused, on principle, to carry a certain drug (a type of birth-control pill) was “forcing his views on others.”

This brought me to the next question. If modern liberalism is illegitimate as an intellectual idea, how is it that it gained ascendancy? And more worrying still - why does it continue to instill allegiance? Is it really true, as Ann Coulter claims, that the electorate simply has no conception of the real agenda and intellectual underpinnings of the "liberal party"?

And then I saw something that explained it neatly, an essay in Samuel Francis's Beautiful Losers. I'll admit that I haven't been overly impressed with the work thus far (and I'm nearing the end.) Francis was recommended to me as the most eloquent of the paleoconservative theorists, and frankly, if this is the best the paleos have got, I can see why the neoconservatives are having their way. Nevertheless, he did make a couple of interesting points, and his explanation of the influence of ideas is one of them.

Francis begins by recounting that ever since the renewal of conservative thought in the 40's, conservative intellectuals have been wedded to Richard Weaver's principle that “Ideas Have Consequences.” In Weaver’s own words,


I take the view that the conscious policies of men and governments are not mere rationalizations of what has been brought about by unaccountable forces. They are rather deductions from our most basic ideas of human destiny, and they have a great, though not unobstructed, power to determine our course.

Put more simply, society is a consequence and an outgrowth of the ideas that empower it. It followed that if conservatives could somehow "win the battle" of ideas (i.e. logically discredit liberalism) then eventually society would, by osmosis, become more conservative. But Francis claims that this assumption is false. He explains,


I have less faith in the power of intellectual abstractions than most of my conservative colleagues. The historian Lewis Namier remarked that "new ideas are not nearly as potent as broken habits"...In the tradition of Namier and Burnham, I place more emphasis on the concrete forces of elites, organization, and psychic and social forces such as class and regional and ethnic identity...as the determining forces in history.

So according to Francis, although ideas have power, that power is meager compared to the manipulations of societal elites. In fact, the elites often espouse an idea not because of its intrinsic worth, but rather because it meshes well with their own agenda and weltanschauung. In a sense, this is the polar opposite of Weaver's view - it is not ideas that creates society, but society that creates the ideas. This is where liberalism enters the picture. Francis writes,


Liberalism barely exists as an independent set of ideas and values. Virtually no significant thinker of this century has endorsed it. Internally, the doctrines of liberalism are so contrary to established fact, inconsistent with each other, and immersed in sentimentalism, resentment, egotism, and self-interest that they cannot be taken seriously as a body of ideas.



Harsh words. If liberalism is a bankrupt idea continues Francis, what explains is ascendancy? He answers that "the ideology or formula of liberalism grows out of the structural interests of the elite that espouses it." He then goes on to delineate the connections he perceives between what he refers to as the managerial elite and the mass-scale aspects of liberalism (which is beyond the scope of this piece.)

Of course, I have serious reservations about his thesis. The kernel of the idea comes from James Burnham, who sought only to explain the impact of the separation of control from ownership in corporate America, and it seems that Francis has stretched the thesis in directions that Burnham never intended. Also, many of the connections Francis draws are dubious at best. And it may just be that Bork is correct - liberalism is nothing more than the radicalism of otherwise healthy values. Nevertheless, if we accept his premise, our original question is answered. Yes, liberalism is bunkum; the reason it remains a powerful influence is because the managerial elite finds it a useful tool. As you can see, I still haven't made up my mind here – I welcome any and all further discussion, as well as any book recommendations that might finally explain the enigma that is modern liberalism.


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Friday, August 11, 2006

the aron and the luchos: one unit

When the parsha recounts the story of the second luchos, there seems to be undo repetitive emphasis placed on the aron:
"...Make two tablets of stone...and an aron of wood" (10:1)
"I wrote on the tablets... and placed them in the aron" (10:2)
"I made an aron of acacia wood and hewed two tablets..." (10:3)
"I came down from the mountain and placed the tablets in the aron..." (10:5)
"At that time G-d seperated the tribe of Levi to carry the aron of the covenant..." (10:8)
If someone is at a Sotheby's auction and buys a multi-million dollar Rembrandt, that person doesn't start asking the auctioneer about the $100 frame the painting is displayed in. So why is such great attention given not just to the luchos, but to the "picture frame" that housed them? It seems while a frame is not integral to the picture it displays, the aron was an inseperable componet of the luchos themselves. This idea is underscored by Rashi's interpretation of which aron the pasuk is speaking about. Rashi writes that this was not the aron of the Mishkan made by Betzalel, but a second aron. When the Mishkan was later constructed, one aron was used to hold the broken luchos, and the aron of the Mishkan held the complete luchos. Ramban asks, if there were indeed two aronos, where was this second one placed? There was room in the Mishkan only to hold one of them! It seems that the Ramban assumes that the aron is defined by its place and function in the Mishkan, but according to Rashi, the aron can exist independent of the Mishkan and as an essential component of the luchos themselves. R' Solovetichik brought proof to this same idea from the Rambam in Hil. Bais haBechira: the Rambam discusses the construction and placement of the klei hamikdash like the menorah, mezbaich, shulchan, etc. all in the context of building the Mikdash, but Rambam omits any discussion of the aron - the aron is not part of the mishkan, but is part of the cheftza of the luchos (Igros haGRI"D p.181). The Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 379) asks: why do the Rambam and Chinuch count as a mitzvah l'doros that only kohanim (according to Ramban even Leviim) carry the aron, but omit the responsibility of the kohanim to carry the other klei hamikdash (as the Torah relates in Parshas baMidbar)? The Meshech Chochma points to the pasuk in our parsha which identifies the kohanim as designated to carry the aron as the source l'doros, but offers no rationale. R' Soloveitchik explained that the other kelim were sanctified based on their utility in the mishkan; once the mishkan was disassembled, their status as klei kodesh was negated. Only the aron by virtue of its intrinsic connection to the luchos retained its status even when the Mishkan was disassembled and required kohanim for transport. The gemara (Yoma 72b) derives halachos of how a talmid chacham should act from the construction of the aron - just as the physical aron held the luchos, a talmid chacham holds within him the Torah learned. Just as the luchos could not be given without the accompanying aron, a person cannot absorb Torah without first transforming him/herself into a proper "kli kibbul" to receive that Torah. The gemara (Shabbos 32b) writes that amei ha'aretz, the uneducated, are punished for calling the aron kodesh by the name "arna", meaning just a box (see Rashi, maharasha). Maharal explains that to the amei ha'aretz the aron is just the frame holding the Rembrandt. However, a talmid chacham recognizes that the aron is the "seichel Eloki", the container which is also called aron kodesh, because the kli to receive Torah is essential to the Torah itself.

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Wednesday, August 09, 2006

"It's Allegorical": Kosher or Not?

WARNING: IF YOU ARE AN ORTHOSKEPTIC, THEN DO NOT BOTHER READING THIS POST.

When Is An Allegorical Reading of Chumash Repugnant To Torah Hashkafa?

In the recent Sturm und Drang (that is fancy-pants talk for heated controversy), many have sought to read certain parts of the Chumash which seem to contradict science as merely allegorical – i.e. they did not really happen. Now to some extent, no one can deny that, at least the very earliest parts of Bereishis are mysterious and defy a conventional explanation. For example, what does a “day” mean prior to the creation of the Sun and the Moon on Day 4? Whatever it means exactly, it certainly does not mean the Sun rose and set as we normally think of it. (R. Shimon Schwab, zt”l, once wrote an essay on harmonizing science and Torah which took this as a starting point. I found it quite worth reading, and curiosly all but ignored in the latest tempest. But that is for another post.) However, beyond these internal issues, it is clear that Chazal, and indeed cross references from the Chumash itself, understood many parts of the Chumash to be literally true.

Rav Aharon Soloveichik once gave a shiur in YU in which he stated that he had no difficulty in accepting a world that was much older than 6000 years. But, the notion that man is descended from animals he found “repugnant” to the Hashkafas ha Torah. We usually think of that word as connoting “arousing disgust or aversion; offensive or repulsive” but here I believe he meant it in the sense of “characterized by contradiction and irreconcilability” (both dictionary definitions of the word). As he explained it, the view that man is descended from animals is “repugnant” to Torah hashkafa because man was created be Tselem Elokim and has a special character above the animals.

Now without getting into whether R. Aharon had a valid complaint on that point, the broader point is certainly valid – if there are well established fundamental hashkafos of the Torah, we cannot accept a scientific explanation repugnant to those hashkafos. I think anyone who calls himself an Orthodox Jew will admit that, even if you got 10,000 scientists in a room and they claimed they could “prove” that, r”l, there is no God, we would pay them not the slightest mind. The Rambam made a similar point about the Aristotlean view that the Universe is eternal – something a religious viewpoint simply cannot accept.

Which got me to thinking, what other fundamentals of Judaism might be “repugnant” to what is the current scientific thinking and an attempt to harmonize them through relegating statements in the Torah as mere “allegory?”

Before I give a few examples, it might be useful to differentiate between “metaphor" and “allegory.” The former uses an image to describe something that happened, but gives it an extra descriptive (perhaps even poetic) character. The most obvious example is the anthropomorphisms of Hashem and his actions in the Torah. They are metaphors to permit the reader to understand what occurred. Another example is the possuk which states that Hashem carried the Jewish people ‘al kanfei nesharim.

Allegory goes beyond metaphor in that the basic story did not occur; the story is merely symbolic of a broader moral or philosophic reality. Shir ha Shirim is probably the best example. As traditionally understood, the sefer does not describe the interaction between an actual, historic pair of lovers, but rather symbolizes the relationship between klal yisroel and HKBH. Claiming that part of the Chumash is mere allegory is going beyond a claim that part of the Chumash is metaphor – it is saying that that part of the Chumash never occurred, but is a mere symbolic story, like Shir ha Shirim.

Here are a few examples where I think an allegorical reading is problematic and perhaps even repugnant to traditional Torah hashkafah:

1. Shabbos

This is an obvious one. The Torah says several times that Shabbos is every seventh day precisely because Hashem created the world in six days and rested on the Seventh. Shabbos is zecher le maaseh bereishis – precisely why a mechallel shabbos be farhesyah is treated like an oved avoda zara – he is denying one of the fundamentals of Judaism, creation.

I do not see how allegorizing the seven days of creation into seven “eras” can be reconciled with Shabbos being every seven days. The Torah emphasizes again and again that the seven days of creation is inherent in the concept of Shabbos. Indeed, the seven day cycle we follow goes back to the creation itself; it is not set (somewhat) arbitrarily the way Yom Tov is.

Acc. to the allegorizers, when was the first Shabbos? What started it? What is our seven day cycle based upon? What does ki sheshes yamim asah Hashem es haShomayim ve'es ha aretz mean?

(I will admit that R. Shimon Schwab’s essay does a brilliant (IMO) job of dealing with this while still permitting a long creation period.)

2. Man Was Created As A Singularity

The Divine Plan is that man was created as one person:


לפיכך נברא אדם יחידי בעולם, ללמד שכל המאבד נפש אחת, מעלים עליו כאילו איבד עולם
מלא; וכל המקיים נפש אחת, מעלים עליו כאילו קיים עולם מלא. ומפני שלום הברייות, שלא יאמר אדם לחברו, אבא גדול מאביך. ושלא יאמרו המינים, רשייות הרבה בשמיים. להגיד גדולתו של
מלך מלכי המלכים, הקדוש ברוך הוא, שאדם טובע מאה מטבעות בחותם אחד, וכולן דומין זה
לזה, מלך מלכי המלכים הקדוש ברוך הוא טובע את כל האדם בחותמו של אדם הראשון, ואין
אחד מהם דומה לחברו. לפיכך לכל אחד ואחד לומר, בשבילי נברא
העולם

This is why Man was created as the only one in the world, to teach you that whomever destroys one soul, he is treated as though he
lost an entire world; and one who saves one soul, is treated as though he saved an entire world. And because of peaceful relations, that one should not tell his fellow, my father is greater than your father. And that the
heretics should not say, there are many powers in the heavens. And to
relate the greatness of the King of Kings of Kings, the Holy One Blessed be He, for a man mints one hundred coins with one seal, and they are all alike; the King of Kings of Kings, the Holy One Blessed be He mints every man with the seal of Adam, and no one of them is similar to the other. For that reason it is incumbent upon each and every person to say, for me the world was created. (Sanedrin 4:5)


This Mishna, which presents us with several fundamental hashkafos, clearly understands that part of the creation story literally – i.e. one man was created, who was the progenitor of all mankind.

I find this Mishna impossible to reconcile with the notion that man evolved from the apes – meaning that thousands or tens of thousands of human beings evolved from tens of thousands of apes somewhere in Africa.

Some have tried to harmonize the story about the creation of man with the evolutionary view by theorizing that Hashem picked an evolved hominid (i.e. a rather intelligent ape) and breathed a neshama into him, and that was Adam ha Rishon. Putting aside that the possuk says that Hashem did this to a pile of dirt, not an ape, I don’t see how this helps anything.

Let’s say there were 10,000 of these advanced ape-men in Africa thousands of years ago. Then Hashem picks one and breathes a neshama into him, and BANG we have Adam ha Rishon. Well, what happened to the rest of them? Did this Adam ha Rishon go back to his ape-friends and interbreed? If so, how was the neshama passed on to Adam’s progeny? Since it takes several generations to introduce new genes into the gene pool, did that mean that a few generations later you had some ape-men with and some without a neshama? Has the Divine neshama now spread to all mankind through intermarriage? Or do we still have some ape-men running around?

Or, alternatively, did all the ape-men (except Adam) suddenly die, and mankind descended from that one Divinely blessed fellow? That explanation would contradict both peshuto shel mikra and scientific evidence, so I don't see what is accomplished by adopting it.

3. LEMINEHU

The words LeMino, Lemina or LeMinehu appears numerous times in the story of Creation – each plant, bird or animal was created “unto its kind.” Most people, myself included, usually just skip over these words without giving them much thought, but they convey an important meaning both hashkafically and halakhically.

Chazal in Chullin (60a-b) darshen on the fact that in Ber. 1:11-12 leminehu appears with regard to the command only as to the trees but not as to the other plants, but when the creation was implemented even the herbs grew leminehu:



דרש רבי חנינא בר פפא (תהילים קד) יהי כבוד ה' לעולם ישמח ה' במעשיו פסוק זה
שר העולם אמרו בשעה שאמר הקב"ה (בראשית א) למינהו באילנות נשאו דשאים קל וחומר
בעצמן אם רצונו של הקב"ה בערבוביא למה אמר למינהו באילנות ועוד ק"ו ומה אילנות שאין
דרכן לצאת בערבוביא אמר הקב"ה למינהו אנו עאכ"ו מיד כל אחד ואחד יצא למינו פתח שר
העולם ואמר יהי כבוד ה' לעולם ישמח ה' במעשיו בעי רבינא הרכיב שני דשאים זה על גב
זה לר' חנינא בר פפא מהו כיון דלא כתב בהו למינהו לא מיחייב או דילמא כיון דהסכים
אידיהו כמאן דכתיב בהו למינהו דמיא תיקו:


R. Chanina b. Papa expounded: May the Glory of Hashem endure forever,
May Hashem rejoice in His works. (Tehillim 104) This verse the Angel of the
World (see Rashi) said at the time HKBH said leminehu for trees, the herbs (i.e.
non-tree plants) made a kal va chomer on themselves: If the will of HKBH
is with a mixture of species [irbuvya] why did he say leminehu for trees,
for trees do not have a nature to grew all mixed together, HKBH commanded
leminehu, for us all the more so. Immediately each one [of the herbs] grew
to its kind [lemino]. The Angel of the World opened and said May the Glory
of Hashem endure forever, May Hashem rejoice in His works.

Ravina asked: one who grafted two [types] of herbs one onto another
according to R. Chanina b. Papa what is the din? Since it is not written
leminehu he is not liable [for grafting kilayim] or perhaps since [Hashem]
agreed with them it is as though it is written by them leminehu.
Teku.

The Maharal explains this Gemara in that the creation of the world was according to a Divine plan which followed a certain logic – Torah logic. (Compare istakel be oraysa u’bara alma). Inherent in a command that the trees should grow leminehu is that this should apply also to all plants – using the logic of kal vachomer. This kal vachomer was a great glory and simcha to HKBH -- the natural world indeed followed this Torah “logic.”

The repeated use of leminehu, lemina or lemino is are a clear statement in the Chumash that, at the time of creation, Hashem set certain types (minim) among the plants and animals, and commanded them to reproduce in kind. Indeed, such a commandment is akin to a mitzvah, since a kal va chomer can be (indeed was) learned out from this commandment from the trees to all plants. As Chazal state, Hashem did not want an irbuvya. He commanded that an apple tree should produce seeds that grow another apple tree, not grow an orange tree. Likewise, a wheat plant produces seeds that produce other wheat plants, not barley plants. Same for animals.

Now this of course does not mean that there is no variation within a min. Obviously no two trees or animals, even of the same type are identical. And, in fact, the idea of a min appears to be broader than what biologists call a species. If you learn Kilayim, it appears that min is a broader concept than species. (I once heard that the Chazon Ish, a great expert in Zeraim, paskened that all citrus fruits are one min and permitted grafting one on another.) But it does mean that there are set parameters for each min which were determined at creation, and it is the Divine Will that plants and animals reproduce within their type.

IMO this simply cannot be reconciled with the Darwinian view that species gradually developed from one another and all species have a common ancestor -- i.e. macroevolution. (Leave aside microevolution for the moment.) Acc. to the Darwinian theory, all life forms are one big irbuvya and, given enough time, a fungus could evolve into an oak tree or an elephant.

Before one dismisses the above as mere aggadata, the concept of minim has clear halakhic implications. All the laws of kilayim are based on the premise that there are different minim of plants and animals which we are forbidden to combine in certain proscribed ways (for animals, harbaah and hanhagah, for plants, harkavah and zeriah.) The quoted gemara expressly links the commandment of leminehu with the issur kilayim. For animals and trees there is a direct textual commandment and hence kilayim applies; Ravina’s unresolved question is whether a leminehu not directly commanded but derived from a kal va chomer counts.

This issue was a major one for Xtians in the early 20th century -- it was called "Fixity of the Species." My quick Googling of that terms revealed some interesting approaches, but none that are acceptable (IMO) of the Orthodox view of the Chumash and the Torah she be al Peh. Only one "Jewish" writer addressed the issue, and all she said was (1) there is no strong evidence for macro-evolution and (2) we can "darshen" away the problem, i.e., not follow pshat. Didn't really deal with the issue, IMO.

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Monday, August 07, 2006

Focus on Eretz Yisrael

All of our hearts and minds are focused on Eretz Yisrael at this time--lebeinu b'mizrach, v'aanu besof hamaariv! It is quite possible that a ceasefire will be forced on Israel before it gets a chance to complete the job, to destroy and/or humble Hizbollah. I have heard talk that Israel may be forced to give up Har Dov/Shaba Farms( see links below). I hope that this will not happen.

I would like to write a bit on some ideas, usual and innovative, that people have been doing in terms of helping--t'zedokah v'chessed-- and what may also still be done. Feel free to add your ideas as well.

Chesed Organizations

I linked a few chesed and humanitarian organizations, at the bottom. There are many advertisements in the various Jewish newspapers that list organizations which do good work. Like any Tzedaka, one should ascertain that the organization is a worthy one. Feel free to add any links and/or names and information of your favorite organizations in the comment section.

Virtual Tourism

The economy in the Galil and Golan relies on tourism. Most of the hotels in these areas are completely empty. Hotels and restaurants provide employment, and have a ripple effect on the whole economy. The Presidents Conference is organizing an innovative "Virtual Israel" program where one can reserve vouchers for many hotels, which will be good for up to a year, in order to jumpstart the economy, and keep these hotels in business. The program is supposed to be up and running in the next day or so.

http://www.conferenceofpresidents.org/

http://www.hofesh-latzafon.co.il/english.asp

Educational Networks

Educational networks such as Migdal Ohr, Shuvu, Chinuch Atzmai, have schools throughout the country, and are providing summer programs for children which they service in the North. They will also need to think about the coming school year in September. I began this list, but it is incomplete! Please add any additional links regarding articles or links of educational networks or services which you have familiarity with, and which service this area of the country, to make this list comprehensive(Chabad, Mizrachi et. al.).

http://www.migdalohr.org/news_North-SC_01-Initiates.html

http://www.jewishmediaresources.com/article/760/

Visiting

New York Assemblyman Dov Hikind took a group of people, from various walks of life, on a Chizuk mission last week. The group delivered helmets and vests to Zaka, and visited Haifa and other cities in the North.

I listened on the Motzoei Shabbos "Dov Hikind Show" to an interview with one mission participant. Originally not aware of the mission, he was even willing to deliver pizza for "Pizza IDF", as long as he could give chizuk in some manner to soldiers! He then found out about this trip, and left his law practice to participate.

People have, unfortunately, cancelled reservations, even to Yerushalayim. However, I have heard that Israelis in regions of the country other than the North are going about their normal business. If someone can afford to travel to Israel at this time, this is certainly a wonderful thing to do.

IDF Uniforms: Physical and Spiritual

Some time ago, I read in the Jewish Press about someone who had been raising funds for bullet-proof vests for combat soldiers(approximately $1,000 a piece). This individual, a reservist, couldn't bear the fact that he had the necessary protective gear, while others didn't have it. He therefore set out to raise money for this purpose. I read this a while ago, and have no information on this. I imagine, however, that the army tries to gives out protective gear to those who need it most.

I, myself, witnessed a very interesting and inspiring incident this Tisha B'aav. I spent the Taanis at the "Tisha B'aav Program" at Ateres Chinka hall in Flatbush. Every year, over a thousand people come to hear lectures which are given throughout the day by various Rabbonim.

Between the speeches, a Rabbi from Matisdorf made an appeal for Tzitis for the IDF soldiers in Lebanon and elsewhere at (at $3 a pair his goal is 15,000 pairs=$45,000). People wanted to do something-- noseh b'ol im chaveiro-- and within 5 minutes, the person had so many checks and dollar bills that he couldn't hold them in his hand anymore! I asked him later in the day how much he had raised from the three or four appeals; he said a few thousand dollars! His organization is tax deductible, and he asks that one earmark the checks "Tzitis for soldiers". If you would like more information, please e-mail me for his contact info(I know this Rabbi is a reliable person).

The story behind the appeal is also interesting:

It seems that as many as 15,000 soldiers at the Lebanese front and elsewhere would be interested in wearing Tzitis. The army tries to get the cheapest bid for its purchases, and ordered these pairs from China! While the "Made in China" label is wonderful for toys and electronics, it is an Halachic disaster, and the army needed to discard all 15,000 pairs.

When a woman from Matisdorf found out about this, she contacted the above-mentioned Rabbi who made the appeal. It seems that army regulations require camouflage green for infantry combat units, but the standard white begadim are okay for all other divisions. As of this past Thursday, a number of pairs were supposed to already have been shipped to the front. Certainly, any soldier who desires to do the Mitzvah(at $3 a pair) should be able to do so. This is both a zechus for the soldiers and a potential kiruv opportunity.

Hasbara, and What We are Up Against

This first linked article, below, includes a draft of the U.N. resolution. However, the organization which posted the text is an extremely left-wing and anti-Israel one. It posts graphic pictures of the "Quana Massacre" and on August 12th, is planning a march against "U.S. and Israeli War Crimes".

According to the website:

" Numerous universities, libraries and research institutions have established a link to [the website, below] on their respective web sites. Global Research has received for three years in succession, the Goodwriters award, classified among the best 80 alternative news sites. Global Research has also become a source of specialized information for journalists"

Malcom Hoenlein has quoted a political analyst to the effect that "wars in the 21st Century will be won, significantly, based on ideas". I can also imagine them sending anti-Israel letters to the President and members of Congress. That is why it is vital that elected officials hear the pro-Israel side from Israel's supporters. May we merit to see Hashem thwart their intentions!

Below is the commentary on the proposed U.N. resolution, and plans for the anti-Israel march:

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060807&articleId=2916

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=A.N20060731&articleId=2869


Two Rambam's

The current situation provides an opportunity to focus on two basic and fundamental Rambam's, linked below. The first is in Hilchos Taanis(1: 1-3), and speaks about introspection and Teshuva upon public misfortune. The second one is in Hilchos Teshuva(3:11), and makes clear the vital necessity of becoming part of a community. By helping in various ways in the area of tzedaka v'chesed, in addition to the spiritual ways of accumulating zechusim by engaging in Tefillah and other Mitzvos, one fulfills the principles inherent in both of the above statements of the Rambam.

Links:

Rambam:

http://www.mechon-mamre.org/i/3901.htm

http://www.mechon-mamre.org/i/1503.htm

U.N. Resolutions and Mount Dov:

http://www.unitedjerusalem.org/index2.asp?id=782850

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=108704

Organizations(Not Exhaustive !):

http://www.yadeliezer.org/

http://www.ou.org/community_services/emergency_fund/

http://www.chabad.org/library/article.asp?AID=405451

http://www.chabad.org/library/article.asp?AID=411257

http://www.mifalchaim.org/eng/main.htm

http://www.hatzalah.org.il/north.php

http://www.zaka.org.il/en/

http://www.ezer-mizion.org.il/

http://www.cross-currents.com/archives/2006/07/25/helping-israel/

http://ezra-lemarpe.org/ambulance02_e.html


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